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Regulation	(EC)	No	593/2008	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	17	
June	2008	on	the	law	applicable	to	contractual	obligations	(Rome	I)	–	
Articles	8	and	9		Etienne	Pataut	Professor	at	the	Sorbonne	School	of	Law	(University	Paris	1)			
Working	Paper		
Article	8	
Individual	employment	contracts	1.			An	 individual	 employment	 contract	 shall	 be	 governed	 by	 the	 law	 chosen	 by	 the	parties	 in	accordance	with	Article	3.	 Such	a	 choice	of	 law	may	not,	however,	have	 the	result	of	 depriving	 the	 employee	 of	 the	 protection	 afforded	 to	 him	by	 provisions	 that	cannot	 be	 derogated	 from	by	 agreement	 under	 the	 law	 that,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 choice,	would	have	been	applicable	pursuant	to	paragraphs	2,	3	and	4	of	this	Article.	2.			To	the	extent	that	the	law	applicable	to	the	individual	employment	contract	has	not	been	chosen	by	the	parties,	the	contract	shall	be	governed	by	the	law	of	the	country	in	which	 or,	 failing	 that,	 from	 which	 the	 employee	 habitually	 carries	 out	 his	 work	 in	performance	of	the	contract.	The	country	where	the	work	is	habitually	carried	out	shall	not	be	deemed	to	have	changed	if	he	is	temporarily	employed	in	another	country.	3.			Where	 the	 law	 applicable	 cannot	 be	 determined	 pursuant	 to	 paragraph	2,	 the	contract	shall	be	governed	by	the	law	of	the	country	where	the	place	of	business	through	which	the	employee	was	engaged	is	situated.	4.			Where	it	appears	from	the	circumstances	as	a	whole	that	the	contract	is	more	closely	connected	with	a	country	other	than	that	indicated	in	paragraphs	2	or	3,	the	law	of	that	other	country	shall	apply.		
Article	9	
Overriding	mandatory	provisions	1.			Overriding	mandatory	provisions	are	provisions	the	respect	for	which	is	regarded	as	crucial	by	a	country	 for	safeguarding	 its	public	 interests,	such	as	 its	political,	social	or	economic	organisation,	to	such	an	extent	that	they	are	applicable	to	any	situation	falling	within	 their	 scope,	 irrespective	 of	 the	 law	otherwise	 applicable	 to	 the	 contract	 under	this	Regulation.	2.			Nothing	in	this	Regulation	shall	restrict	the	application	of	the	overriding	mandatory	provisions	of	the	law	of	the	forum.	3.			Effect	may	be	given	to	the	overriding	mandatory	provisions	of	the	law	of	the	country	where	the	obligations	arising	out	of	the	contract	have	to	be	or	have	been	performed,	in	so	far	as	those	overriding	mandatory	provisions	render	the	performance	of	the	contract	
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unlawful.	In	considering	whether	to	give	effect	to	those	provisions,	regard	shall	be	had	to	 their	 nature	 and	 purpose	 and	 to	 the	 consequences	 of	 their	 application	 or	 non-application.			
Introduction.			Regulation	593/2008,	the	so-called	Rome	1	Regulation	1,	is	the	European	text	governing	choice	of	 laws	 in	 contractual	matters.	 It	was	preceded	by	 the	well-known	1980	Rome	Convention,	adopted	between	the	Member	States	of	the	then	European	Community	and	entered	 into	 force	 in	 19912.	 Attached	 to	 the	Rome	Convention	was	 an	 official	 Report,	which	 is	 still	 of	 great	 help	 for	 the	 interpretation	 of	 both	 the	 Convention	 and	 the	subsequent	 Regulation3.	 The	 Rome	 Convention	 is	 applicable	 to	 contracts	 concluded	between	April	1st	1991	and	June	17th	2008.	Contracts	concluded	before	April	1991	are	governed	 by	 national	 choice	 of	 law	 rules,	 contract	 concluded	 after	 June	 2008	 are	governed	by	Rome	1	Regulation.	The	decision	to	transform	the	Rome	Convention	into	an	European	Regulation	was	taken	the	entry	into	force	of	the	Amsterdam	Treaty	in	1999.	The	Amsterdam	Treaty	added	to	the	 EC	Treaty	 article	 65	 (now	 article	 81	TFEU)	which	 gave	 the	 European	Community	competence	to	adopt	measures	in	the	field	of	private	international	law.	Article	65	TEC	is	therefore	 the	 legal	basis	of	 the	Rome	1	Regulation4	as	 it	 is	 for	 the	many	other	private	international	law	regulations	adopted	since	2000.		The	 Rome	 1	 Regulation	 concerns	 contracts	 in	 general	 and	 therefore	 is	 not	 a	 text	specifically	 devoted	 to	 labour	 law.	 However,	 it	 contains	 a	 specific	 provision	 on	individual	 employment	 contracts,	 which	 led	 to	 case	 law	 from	 the	 Court	 of	 Justice	(Section	1).	Eventually,	the	mandatory	nature	of	labour	law	in	many	European	countries	triggered	 an	 important	 discussion	 about	 the	 applicability	 of	 international	 mandatory	rules	to	labour	law	issues	(section	2).			
Section	1.	Individual	Employment	Contracts	(Article	8)		
1. Party	autonomy.			
a.	Choice	of	law	Party	autonomy	is	one	of	the	corner	stones	of	the	Rome	1	Regulation.	Like	the	the	Rome	Convention,	Article	3	of	the	Regulation	allows	for	a	broad	freedom	of	choice.	The	parties	are	therefore	free	to	choose	the	law	applicable	to	their	contract.																																																									1	Regulation	(EC)	No	593/2008	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	17	June	2008	on	the	law	
applicable	to	contractual	obligations	(Rome	I),	OJ	L	177,	4	july	2008,	p.	6.	2	Convention	on	the	law	applicable	to	contractual	obligations,	OJ	L	266,	9	oct.1980,	p.	1.	3	M.	Giuliano	and	P.	Lagarde,	“Report	on	the	Convention	on	the	law	applicable	to	contractual	obligations”,	
OJ	C	282	,	31	oct.	1980,	p.	1.		4	Preamble,	par.	2	:		
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The	 same	 solution	 does	 not	 apply,	 however	 to	 employment	 contracts.	 It	 is	 widely	accepted	 that	 for	 contracts	 involving	a	weaker	party,	 freedom	of	 choice	of	 the	parties	should	be	 limited.	Comparative	 studies	show	 that	national	 and	 international	 choice	of	law	 rules	 either	 provide	 for	 a	 limited	 party	 autonomy	 for	 employment	 contract5	or	exclude	labour	contracts	from	the	Scope	of	the	instruments.		An	example	of		a	full	exclusion	can	be	found	in	the	recent	Hague	Principles	on	Choice	of	Law	in	International	Commercial	Contracts.	As	the	commentary	clearly	puts	it	6	:		“This	exclusion	 is	 justified	by	the	 fact	 that	 the	substantive	 law	of	many	States	subjects	consumer	and	employment	contracts	to	special	protective	rules	from	which	the	parties	may	not	derogate	by	 contract.	These	 rules	are	aimed	at	protecting	 the	weaker	party	 -	consumer	or	employee	-	 from	an	abuse	of	 the	 freedom	of	contract	and	this	protection	extends	 to	private	 international	 law	where	 it	appears	as	an	exclusion	or	 limitation	on	party	autonomy.”	To	 the	 contrary,	 the	 Rome	 1	 Regulation	 does	 not	 fully	 exclude	 party	 autonomy	 for	employment	 contracts,	 but	 provides	 for	 limited	 party	 autonomy.	 Article	 8	 of	 the	Regulation	states	that	“an	individual	employment	contract	shall	be	governed	by	the	law	chosen	by	the	parties”.	In	other	words,	the	freedom	of	choice	is	explicitly	accepted	and	the	chosen	law	is	the	law	of	the	contract.		However,	article	8	further	provides	that:	“such	a	choice	of	law	may	not,	however,	have	the	result	of	depriving	the	employee	of	the	protection	afforded	to	him	by	provisions	that	cannot	be	derogated	 from	by	agreement	under	the	law	that,	in	the	absence	of	choice”.	The	rationale	behind	this	solution	is	to	apply	the	most	protective	law	:	either	the	chosen	law	or	the	law	applicable	in	the	absence	of	choice.		
b.	Interpretation	A	particular	difficulty	arose	from	the	wording	of	Article	6	of	the	Rome	convention,	which	provides	that:		“in	 a	 contract	 of	 employment	 a	 choice	 of	 law	made	 by	 the	 parties	 shall	 not	 have	 the	result	 of	 depriving	 the	 employee	 of	 the	 protection	 afforded	 to	 him	by	 the	mandatory	rules	of	the	law	which	would	be	applicable	under	paragraph	2	in	the	absence	of	choice”.		This	wording	was	somewhat	unclear:	the	words	“mandatory	rules”,	could	either	refer	to	the	 internationally	 mandatory	 rules	 of	 the	 then	 Article	 7	 (now	 9)	 or	 to	 the	 broader	concept	 of	 internal	 mandatory	 rules,	 i.e:	 the	 rules	 that	 cannot	 be	 derogated	 from	 by	agreement.	Recitals	15	and	37	of	the	Regulation	and	the	new	wording	of	Article	8	of	the	Regulation	clarified	 the	 situation.	 They	 clearly	 refer	 to	 all	 the	 labour	 law	 rules	 that	 cannot	 be	departed	 from	in	the	designated	State.	Therefore	the	parties	can	choose	to	govern	the	contract	by	a	law	different	to	the	one	applicable	in	the	absence	of	choice,	but	only	to	the	extent	that	this	latter	law	allows	for	party	autonomy	within	its	own	system.																																																									5	See	the	comparative	elements	given	by	S.	Symeonides,	Codifying	Choice	of	law	around	the	world,	Oxford	UP,	2014,	at	p.	127.	6	Hague	Conference	of	Private	International	Law,	“	Principles	on	Choice	of	Law	in	International	Commercial	Contracts”,	2015,	par.	1.10	of	the	commentaries.	Accessible	at:	https://assets.hcch.net/docs/5da3ed47-f54d-4c43-aaef-5eafc7c1f2a1.pdf	(last	visit	30	June	2017).	
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c.	Comparison	between	 the	chosen	 law	and	 the	 law	applicable	 in	 the	absence	of	
choice	If	 the	 law	 applicable	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 choice	 allows	 for	 such	 a	 choice	 of	 law,	 a	comparison	 must	 be	 made	 between	 the	 chosen	 law	 and	 the	 law	 applicable	 in	 the	absence	of	choice.	The	very	wording	of	Article	8,	stating	that	the	choice	of	a	particular	law	should	not	“have	the	 result	 of	 depriving	 the	 employee	 of	 the	 protection	 afforded	 to	 him”	 by	 the	 law	applicable	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 choice,	 shows	 that	 the	 provision	 grants	 a	 substantive	protection	to	the	worker.	The	objective	 is	 to	ensure	that	 the	worker	benefits	 from	the	most	protective	rule	of	the	two	potentially	applicable	laws.	The	 difficulty	 is	 to	 determine	 how	 to	 compare	 the	 two	 systems.	 Three	 possibilities	appear:	 (i)	 comparison	 between	 individual	 situations,	 (ii)	 comparison	 between	 legal	systems	 as	 a	whole,	 (iii)	 comparison	 between	 substantive	 legal	 categories7.	 Scholarly	usually	prefer	the	third	option,	although	the	exact	outcome	of	the	various	possibilities	is	not	always	very	clear8.		This	important	methodological	difficulty	has	yet	to	be	tackled	by	the	European	Court	of	justice,	and	clear	guidance	in	this	respect	would	be	of	great	help.			
2. Place	of	performance	and	place	of	engagement	
a.	Determining	the	place	of	performance	of	the	Contract	The	law	applicable	in	the	absence	of	choice	is	the	law	“of	the	country	in	which	or,	failing	that,	 from	which	 the	 employee	 habitually	 carries	 out	 his	work	 in	 performance	 of	 the	contract”.	 The	 place	 of	 performance	 of	 the	 contract	 is	 the	 main	 connecting	 factor	 in	private	international	labour	law.	It	is	indeed	the	main	connecting	factor	for	international	jurisdiction	(Reg.	Brussels	1,	art.	21)9,	and	it	is	the	primary	connection	for	social	security	purposes	 (Reg.	 883/2004,	 art.	 11)10.	 There	 are	many	 reasons	 for	 giving	 an	 important	role	 to	 this	 connecting	 factor.	Workers	 are	 not	 only	 governed	 by	 individual	 contracts,	they	are	also	part	of	a	local	labour	force	which,	in	search	for	as	much	social	coherence	as	possible,	should	be	governed	by	the	same	rules.	Moreover,	individual	rules	of	labour	law	are	also	part	of	a	wider	network	of	rules	governing	industrial	relations,	and,	once	again,	for	social	coherence	purposes,	choice	of	law	rules	should	lead	as	much	as	possible	to	a	global	and	coherent	legal	regime.		It	can	sometimes	be	difficult	to	determine	the	place	of	performance	of	a	specific	labour	contract.	Different	situations	must	be	distinguished.																																																										7	See	O.	Deinert,	International	Labour	Law	under	the	Rome	Conventions,	CH	Beck	–	Hart	–	Nomos,	2017,	at.	122.	8	See,	e.g.,	the	ambiguous	position	of	the	French	Cour	de	cassation	in	:	Soc,	12	november	2002,	Briand,	Rev.	
Crit.DIP.,	2003.	446,	note	Jault,	JDI	2004,	p.	131,	note	S.	Dion,		Dr.	Soc.	2003.	339,	note	MA	Moreau,	RdC	2003.	206,	obs.	P.	Deumier.		9	Regulation	(EU)	No	1215/2012	of	12	December	2012	on	jurisdiction	and	the	recognition	and	enforcement	
of	judgments	in	civil	and	commercial	matters,	OJ	L	351,	20.12.2012	;	For	an	extensive	commentary	on	this	text,	see	Supra,	p.	XXX.	10Regulation	(EC)	No	883/2004	of	29	April	2004	on	the	coordination	of	social	security	systems,	OJ	L	166,	30.4.2004,	1-123	;	for	an	extensive	commentary	on	this	text,	see	Supra,	p.	XXX.		
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For	posted	workers,	Article	8	of	the	Regulation	states	that			“the	 Country	 where	 the	 work	 is	 habitually	 carried	 out	 shall	 not	 be	 deemed	 to	 have	changed	if	he	is	temporarily	employed	in	another	country”.		Thus,	in	case	of	temporary	posting	of	a	worker	in	another	country,	the	law	applicable	to	the	contract	does	not	change	and	remains	the	law	of	the	place	where	the	worker	used	to	work.	 This	 solution	 led	 to	many	 difficulties,	 partly	 tackled	 by	 the	 use	 of	 international	mandatory	rules,	as	will	be	seen	below.		For	mobile	workers	or	workers	that	have	different	places	of	works	over	the	course	of	time,	the	ECJ	has	adopted	in	two	decisions	the	same	approach	than	the	one	adopted	in	the	jurisdiction	context	for	mobile	workers11.		In	 short,	 the	ECJ	decided	 that	a	broad	 and	 favourable	 interpretation	of	 the	 concept	of	“place	of	performance”	should	be	adopted.		As	the	Courts	puts	it	in	the	Koelzsch	case	(n°50):		“In	 a	 situation	 in	 which	 an	 employee	 carries	 out	 his	 activities	 in	 more	 than	 one	Contracting	State,	the	country	in	which	the	employee	habitually	carries	out	his	work	in	performance	of	 the	 contract,	within	 the	meaning	of	 that	provision,	 is	 that	 in	which	or	from	which,	in	the	light	of	all	the	factors	which	characterise	that	activity,	the	employee	performs	the	greater	part	of	his	obligations	towards	his	employer.”	Such	a	broad	interpretation	ensures	both	stability	to	the	applicable	law	and	protection	to	 the	 worker.	 First,	 the	 stability	 lies	 in	 the	 necessity	 to	 take	 into	 account	 a	 global	analysis	 of	 the	 situation	 in	 order	 to	 determine	 the	 country	 with	 which	 the	 labour	relation	has	the	closest	connection.	To	that	extent,	 the	wording	of	 the	Court,	based	on	Article	 6	 of	 the	 Rome	 Convention,	 is	 in	 line	with	 the	 new	wording	 of	 article	 8	 of	 the	Regulation.	 The	 new	provision	 has	 been	 slightly	modified	 to	 allow	 for	 the	 taking	 into	account	the	country	“from	which”	the	employee	habitually	carries	out	his	work.	Second,	the	protection	of	the	worker	is	based	on	the	necessity	to	find	one	and	only	one	applicable	law	to	the	employment	contract,	refusing	therefore	the	possibility,	sometimes	considered	by	some	authors,	that	a	contract	could	be	governed	alternatively	by	several	laws12.	Moreover,	it	lies	also	on	the	will	of	the	Court	to	diminish	the	importance	of	the	secondary	connecting	factor:	the	place	of	engagement.		
b.	Place	of	engagement	Article	8	states	that	if	there	is	no	place	of	performance	of	the	contract,	then	it	should	be	governed	 by	 “the	 law	 of	 the	 country	 where	 the	 place	 of	 business	 through	 which	 the	employee	was	engaged	is	situated”.	This	connecting	factor	has	always	been	narrowly	interpreted	by	the	ECJ,	which	showed	great	reluctance	to	fall	back	to	the	place	of	engagement	factor.	The	main	reason,	which	was	 clearly	 stated	 by	 the	 Court	 in	 the	 jurisdiction	 context13,	 is	 that	 the	 place	 of	performance	 can	 be	 unilaterally	 determined	 by	 the	 employer,	 thus	 allowing	 for	opportunistic	 behaviour.	 In	 a	 labour	 mobility	 context,	 the	 risk	 is	 that	 the	 place	 of																																																									11	ECJ,	15	march	2011,	Koelzsch,	case	C-29/10	;	ECJ,	15	december	2011,	Voogsgerd,	caseC-384/10.		12	See	the	discussion	in	:	F.	Pocar,	«	La	protection	de	la	partie	faible	en	droit	international	privé	»,	Rec.	
Cours	1984,	vol.	188,	p.	339.	13	ECJ,	15	feb.	1989,	Six	Constructions,	case	32/88	
	 6	
engagement	be	selected	in	order	to	select	both	the	competent	courts	and	the	applicable	law.		The	EJC	took	this	risk	very	seriously,	and	decided	to	use	this	secondary	factor	as	little	as	possible,	precisely	by	giving	a	broad	interpretation	to	the	concept	of	“place	of	work”,	as	has	been	seen	above.		Moreover,	 the	 Court	 disregarded	 a	 legal	 or	 abstract	 interpretation	 of	 the	 concept	 of	place	of	engagement,	deciding	that,	where	it	was	to	be	used,	it	was	to	be	understood	as	a	purely	“factual”	concept.		As	the	Court	held	in	the	Voogsgerd	case	(n°	46)	:		“Indeed,	the	use	of	the	term	‘engaged’	in	Article	6(2)(b)	of	the	Rome	Convention,	clearly	refers	purely	to	 the	conclusion	of	the	contract	or,	 in	 the	case	of	a	de	facto	employment	relationship,	to	the	creation	of	the	employment	relationship	and	not	to	the	way	in	which	the	employee’s	actual	employment	is	carried	out.”	Due	to	the	broad	interpretation	given	to	the	very	concept	of	place	of	performance,	and	the	 narrow	 and	 factual	 interpretation	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 place	 of	 engagement,	 the	subsidiary	connecting	factor	is	seldom	used	in	private	international	labour	law.			
3. Escape	clause		The	escape	clause	was	an	important	innovation	of	the	Rome	Convention,	and	was	kept	in	the	Regulation.	When	the	parties	do	not	choose	the	law,	it	allows	the	judge	to	apply	a	law	 other	 than	 the	 one	 that	 should	 be	 applicable,	 “where	 it	 is	 clear	 from	 all	 the	circumstances	of	the	case	that	the	contract	is	manifestly	more	closely	connected	with	a	country	 other	 than	 indicated	 in	 paragraphs	 1	 and	 2	 ”	 (article	 4§3	 of	 the	 Rome	 1	regulation,	 former	4§5	of	 the	Rome	Convention).	This	solution	 is	designed	to	allow	for	some	flexibility	if	the	connecting	factor	of	the	choice	of	law	rule	leads	to	a	law	that	does	not	have	sufficient	links	with	the	situation.	This	general	rule	is	not	very	easy	to	construe.		One	of	the	important	issues	is	whether	the	escape	clause	applies	only	if	the	connecting	factors	adopted	by	the	choice	of	law	rule	have	no	value,	or	if	it	is	enough	to	establish	that	it	is	clear	that	there	is	a	stronger	connection	with	the	law	of	another	country.	The	ECJ,	in	its	very	 first	decision	on	 the	Rome	Convention,	opted	 for	 the	 latter	solution,	 affirming	that:		“Article	4(5)	of	the	Convention	must	be	construed	as	meaning	that,	where	it	is	clear	from	the	circumstances	as	a	whole	that	the	contract	is	more	closely	connected	with	a	country	other	than	that	determined	on	the	basis	of	one	of	the	criteria	set	out	in	Article	4(2)	to	(4)	of	the	Convention,	it	is	for	the	court	to	disregard	those	criteria	and	apply	the	law	of	the	country	with	which	the	contract	is	most	closely	connected”.14	Article	8	of	the	Rome	1	Regulation	follows	the	same	solution	for	employment	contracts,	with	 a	 slightly	 different	 wording.	 In	 particular,	 it	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	 the	 word	“manifestly”	 is	missing	 in	 Article	 8,	 leading	 to	 questioning	whether	 the	 escape	 clause	should	be	construed	identically	in	the	context	of	Articles	4	and	8.		
																																																								14	ECJ,	(Grand	Chamber),	6	October	2009,	Case	C-133/08,	Intercontainer	Interfrigo	SC	(ICF)	v.	Balkenende	
Oosthuizen	BV,	MIC	Operations	BV.	
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Another	question	was	whether	the	application	of	the	escape	clause	should	leave	room	to	substantial	protection	of	the	worker.	In	the	context	of	jurisdiction,	and	as	soon	as	1981,	the	 ECJ	 made	 it	 clear	 that	 the	 connecting	 factors	 should	 be	 interpreted	 in	 favorem15.		Should	 this	 favourable	 interpretation	 be	 imported	 in	 the	 functioning	 of	 the	 escape	clause?	This	 question	 was	 raised	 before	 the	 ECJ	 in	 an	 important	 2013	 decision16.	 The	 Court	decided	 in	 favour	 of	 an	 identical	 interpretation	 of	 the	 escape	 clause	 in	 contracts	 in	general,	and	in	employment	contracts	;	and	this	despite	the	different	wording	of	Articles	4	and	8	and	the	peculiarities	of	the	choice	of	law	rule	for	employment	contracts.		The	 facts	 of	 the	 case	 are	 particularly	 relevant	 to	 that	 extent.	 The	 employee	 had	 been	working	for	12	years	in	the	Netherlands	for	her	German	employer.		She	was	then	asked	to	come	back	to	Germany.	Dissatisfied	with	the	new	employment	contract,	she	initiated	several	judicial	actions	in	the	Netherlands.	In	that	context,	the	question	arose	which	law	was	 applicable	 to	 her	 employment	 contract.	 The	 place	 of	 performance	 of	 the	 initial	contract	was	undoubtedly	in	the	Netherlands	and	therefore,	prima	facie,	Dutch	law	was	applicable	 to	 the	 contract.	 The	 employer	 nevertheless	 argued	 in	 favour	 of	 the	application	of	German	law,	with	which	he	claimed	the	contract	had	closer	connections.	It	was	clear	from	the	factual	context	that	German	law	was	less	favourable	than	Dutch	law.	Applying	the	escape	clause	would	therefore	be	a	disadvantage	for	the	employee.		The	Court	nevertheless	decided	to	apply	the	clause.	It	held	that:		“Article	 6(2)	 [now	 8	 (4)]	 (…),	 must	 be	 interpreted	 as	 meaning	 that,	 even	 where	 an	employee	carries	out	the	work	 in	performance	of	 the	contract	habitually,	 for	a	 lengthy	period	and	without	interruption	in	the	same	country,	the	national	court	may,	under	the	concluding	part	of	 that	provision,	disregard	 the	 law	of	 the	 country	where	 the	work	 is	habitually	carried	out,	if	it	appears	from	the	circumstances	as	a	whole	that	the	contract	is	more	closely	connected	with	another	country.”	It	is	therefore	clear	from	the	decision	of	the	Court	that	an	escape	clause	can	be	used	even	if	 the	main	connecting	 factor	 is	 indeed	stable	and	meaningful,	and	 if	 the	application	of	the	 law	 with	which	 the	 situation	 has	 the	 closest	 connection	 is	 less	 favourable	 to	 the	employee.	In	 order	 to	 establish	 a	 closest	 connection,	 the	 court	 took	 into	 account	 several	 factors.	The	Court	noted	 that	Germany	was	 the	place	 of	 residence	of	 the	employee	and	of	 the	seat	of	the	employer,	the	country	of	employee’s	taxation	and	social	security.	The	Court	considered	 that	 those	 factors	 tipped	 the	 balance	 in	 favour	of	 German	 law	rather	 than	Dutch	 law.	This	solution	should	however	remain	quite	rare,	since	the	country	that	has	competence	 for	 matters	 of	 social	 security	 is	 also,	 in	 principle,	 the	 country	 of	performance	of	the	employment	contract17.	In	the	case	before	the	ECJ,	the	employee	was	in	 an	 exceptional	 situation,	 having	 her	 social	 security	 in	 a	 place	 different	 from	 the	employment	 contract’s	 place	 of	 performance.	 This	 resulted	 from	 a	 specific	 agreement	between	 the	Dutch	 and	German	social	 security	 administrations,	 proving	 therefore	 the	importance	of	the	connection	between	the	German	legal	system	and	the	plaintiff.		
																																																								15	ECJ,	26	may	1982,	Ivenel,	Case	133/81	16	ECJ,	12	September	2013,	Case	C-64/12,	Anton	Schlecker	v	Melitta	Josefa	Boedeker.	17	See	supra,	analysis	of	Reg.	883/2004.		
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In	spite	of	the	peculiarities	of	the	case,	it	is	nevertheless	now	clear	that	the	application	of	the	escape	clause	does	not	depend	on	the	substantial	level	of	protection	granted	by	the	law,	which	appear	to	have	the	closest	connection	with	the	case.			
Section	2.	Overriding	mandatory	rules	(Article	9)		
1.	Definition	The	 possible	 application	 of	 international	 mandatory	 rules	 is	 another	 important	innovation	in	the	Rome	convention,	and	subsequently	in	the	Rome	1	regulation.		While	 the	definition	of	 concept	 of	overriding	mandatory	 rules	 (or	 “lois	de	police”)	 has	been	 the	 subject	 of	 extensive	 scholarly	 debate,	 their	 existence	 and	 applicability	 are	widely	accepted	nowadays.	Indeed	some	rules	are	of	such	fundamental	importance	that,	provided	the	situation	falls	within	their	scope,	they	must	be	applied	in	a	given	country.	The	aim	of	Article	9	of	the	Regulation	 is	 to	 frame	the	application	of	 those	rules	as	precisely	as	possible.	As	 far	as	clarity	 is	 concerned,	Article	9	 is	 a	welcome	 improvement	 compared	 to	article	7	of	 the	Rome	Convention,	even	if	the	provision	on	the	application	of	foreign	mandatory	rules	is	unduly	restrictive,	as	will	be	seen	in	par.	3.	Article	 9§1	 gives	 a	 definition,	 largely	 inspired	 by	 the	 classic	 definition	 put	 forth	 by	Francescakis	in	the	60’s18.		This	 definition	 puts	 weight	 both	 on	 the	 substance	 of	 those	 rules,	 which	 should	 be	“provisions	the	respect	for	which	is	regarded	as	crucial	by	a	country	for	safeguarding	its	public	 interests,	 such	 as	 its	 political,	 social	 or	 economic	 organisation”,	 and	 on	 their	
applicability,	 since	 “they	 are	 applicable	 to	 any	 situation	 falling	 within	 their	 scope,	irrespective	of	the	law	otherwise	applicable	to	the	contract	under	this	Regulation”.	Even	this	 definition	 is	 not	 specific	 enough	 to	 deal	 with	 all	 possible	 situations,	 experience	shows	 that	 it	 has	 been	 extensively	 used	 by	 national	 courts	 in	 international	 litigation.	Internationally	mandatory	rule	(or	loi	de	police)	is	now	a	widespread	concept	in	modern	private	international	law.	Labour	 law	is,	of	course,	only	one	area,	amongst	others,	where	 lois	de	police	can	come	into	play;	it	is	however,	a	particularly	interesting	area	regarding	overriding	mandatory	rules	either	from	the	forum	State	of	from	a	foreign	state.			
2.	Mandatory	rules	of	the	forum	The	applicability	of	overriding	mandatory	rules	of	 the	 forum	is	widely	accepted	 in	the	context	of	choice	of	law	for	contracts	in	general.	The	Regulation	provides	that:		“Nothing	 in	 this	 Regulation	 shall	 restrict	 the	 application	 of	 the	 overriding	mandatory	provisions	of	the	law	of	the	forum.”	
																																																								18	Ph.	Francescakis,	«	Quelques	précisions	sur	"les	lois	d'application	immédiate"	et	leurs	rapport	avec	les	règles	de	conflit	de	lois	»,	Rev.	Crit.	DIP.	1966.	1.	
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Therefore,	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 overriding	 mandatory	 rules	 in	 the	 forum,	 a	 State	 may	disregard	the	law	normally	applicable	(chosen	or	designated	by	an	objective	connecting	factor)	and	apply	the	law	of	the	forum	instead.	In	 the	 European	 labour	 law	 context,	 the	 application	 of	 the	 mandatory	 rules	 was	particularly	 discussed	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 posting	 of	 workers.	 Secondary	 law	 now	governs	this	question	and	dir.	96/71	and	2014/6719		have	partly	solved	the	difficulty.		Before	those	texts	were	adopted,	the	question	led	to	considerable	debate	and	numerous	cases	of	the	ECJ.	In	a	nutshell,	the	difficulty	arose	from	the	possible	difference	between	the	law	of	the	place	of	the	habitual	work	and	the	law	of	the	place	where	the	worker	was	posted.	According	to	Article	8	(then	6	of	 the	Rome	convention)	the	 former	 law	should	remain	applicable.	However,	Article	9	 (then	7)	allows	 the	posting	State	 to	 impose	 the	application	 of	 the	 law	 of	 the	 forum	 if	 the	 relevant	 provision	 is	 an	 international	mandatory	 rule.	 It	 was	 therefore	 possible,	 for	 example,	 for	 one	 State	 to	 impose	application	of	rules	on	minimum	wage	to	employment	contracts	governed	by	the	law	of	another	State.	In	private	international	law	terms,	the	debate	was	therefore	rather	simple	to	handle.	In	sum,	the	so-called	“law	of	origin”	was	applicable	to	the	contract,	but	the	law	of	 the	 posting	 State	 could	 impose	 the	 application	 of	 some	 of	 its	 own	 rules,	 the	internationally	mandatory	rules.	This	analysis	got	however	more	complex,	due	to	the	particular	nature	of	the	freedom	of	movements	of	 the	EU.	 It	was	argued	 that	 the	mandatory	application	of	 the	 law	of	 the	forum	hindered	the	freedom	of	movement	of	services,	since	it	led	to	increased	cost	and	complexity	 for	 the	 employer.	 This	 argument	 was	 ultimately	 rejected	 by	 the	 Court	 of	justice	on	several	occasions,	including	the	seminal	Arblade	case20.	The	 case	 concerned	 two	 French	 building	 companies	 that	 posted	 workers	 in	 Belgium.	After	an	inspection	from	the	Belgian	labour’s	administration,	it	occurred	that	the	French	employer	 violated	 some	 requirements	 of	 Belgian	 labour	 law.	 The	 administration	therefore	initiated	proceeding	against	the	employers	before	the	Belgian	courts.		The	 employers	 argued	 that	 they	 respected	 French	 law	 and	 that	 the	 mandatory	application	of	Belgian	law	would	be	an	obstacle	to	their	free	movement	of	services.		Following	 the	 reasoning	 it	 had	 adopted	 in	 previous	 decisions,	 the	 Court	 applied	 a	threefold	argument.	First,	it	held	that	the	application	of	internationally	mandatory	rules	in	 the	host	State	constituted	a	restriction	to	the	 freedom	of	services	(n°	50);	second	 it	found	that	such	an	application	could	nevertheless	be	accepted	since	(n°	52)	:		“the	 public	 interest	 relating	 to	 the	 social	 protection	 of	 workers	 in	 the	 construction	industry	 and	 the	monitoring	 of	 compliance	with	 the	 relevant	 rules	may	 constitute	 an	overriding	requirement	justifying	the	imposition	on	an	employer	established	in	another	Member	State	who	provides	services	in	the	host	Member	State	of	obligations	capable	of	constituting	restrictions	on	freedom	to	provide	services.	Third,	the	application	of	mandatory	rules	must	benefit	the	workers.	If	they	already	enjoy	an	 equivalent	 level	 of	 protection	 in	 the	 State	 of	 origin,	 there	 is	 no	 need	 to	 apply	 the																																																									19	Directive	96/71	of	16	December	1996	concerning	the	posting	of	workers	in	the	framework	of	the	
provision	of	services,	OJ	L	18,	21.1.1997,	p.	1–6	;	Directive	2014/67	of	15	May	2014	on	the	enforcement	of	
Directive	96/71/EC	concerning	the	posting	of	workers	in	the	framework	of	the	provision	of	services,	OJ	L	159,	28.5.2014,	p.	11–31	;	for	a	commentary	on	these	texts,	see	supra,	p.	XXX.		20	ECJ,	23	November	1999,	Arblade,	Case.	C-369/96	and	C-376/96.	
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mandatory	 rules	 of	 the	 host	 State.	 Accordingly,	 their	 application	would	 constitute	 an	undue	restriction	of	the	employer’s	freedom	of	movement.	In	the	words	of	the	ECJ	(operative	part,	n°2)	:		“Articles	 59	 and	 60	 of	 the	 Treaty	 preclude	 the	 imposition	 by	 a	 Member	 State	 on	 an	undertaking	established	in	another	Member	State,	and	temporarily	carrying	out	work	in	the	first	State,	of	an	obligation	-	even	if	laid	down	in	public-order	legislation	-	to	pay,	in	respect	 of	 each	 worker	 deployed,	 employers'	 contributions	 to	 schemes	 such	 as	 the	Belgian	 `timbres-intempéries'	 and	 `timbres-fidélité'	 schemes,	 and	 to	 issue	 to	 each	 of	such	workers	an	individual	record,	where	the	undertaking	in	question	is	already	subject,	in	 the	 Member	 State	 in	 which	 it	 is	 established,	 to	 obligations	 which	 are	 essentially	comparable,	 as	 regards	 their	 objective	 of	 safeguarding	 the	 interests	 of	 workers,	 and	which	relate	to	the	same	workers	and	the	same	periods	of	activity.”	In	sum,	if	the	mandatory	rule	of	the	forum	provides	a	clear	benefit	to	the	worker,	it	can	be	applied.	If	not,	then	the	ECJ	case	law	requires	a	comparison	between	the	law	of	origin	and	the	law	of	the	host	State,	which	will	not	be	straightforward	in	many	cases.		This	case	law	is	now	largely	outdated	due	to	the	entry	into	force	of	the	1996	posting	of	workers	directive,	which	tackles	directly	the	problem.	It	remains	that	the	1996	directive	leaves	 many	 unanswered	 questions,	 and	 that	 the	 ECJ	 previous	 cases	 are	 thus	 still	important	 to	 understand	 the	 interpretation	 of	 secondary	 legislation	 in	 the	 posting	 of	workers	field.		
3.	Foreign	mandatory	rules	The	 very	 possibility	 of	 applying	 foreign	 mandatory	 rules	 led	 to	 considerable	 debate	among	 scholars,	 and	 this	 despite	 of	 the	 very	 few	 reported	 cases	 on	 the	matter.	 Some	argue	against	 their	application	on	the	basis	 that	 there	no	 is	reason	to	give	effect	 to	an	imperative	 policy	 of	 a	 foreign	 country	 unless	 the	mandatory	 rules	 stem	 from	 the	 law	applicable	 to	 the	 contract	 itself.	 Otherwise,	 they	 argue,	 the	 application	 of	 foreign	mandatory	 rules	 could	 lead	 to	 judicial	 uncertainty	 and	 set	 off	 the	 balance	 of	 justice	between	 the	 parties.	 To	 the	 contrary,	 according	 to	 other	 scholars,	 the	 application	 of	foreign	mandatory	 rule	enhances	 judicial	 cooperation	and	mutual	 trust	 in	 the	EU.	The	judicial	discretion	allows	for	nuanced	solutions	applying	foreign	mandatory	rules,	if	and	only	if	they	correspond	to	the	forum’s	policy21.	The	 strict	 opposition	 to	 the	 applicability	 of	 foreign	 mandatory	 rules	 from	 some	countries	 (among	 which	 UK	 and	 Germany)	 led	 to	 a	 possible	 reservation	 on	 the	 then	Article	 7§1	 of	 the	 Rome	 Convention.	 Moreover,	 when	 the	 Rome	 Convention	 was	transformed	 into	 the	 Rome	 1	 Regulation	 (which	 is	 incompatible	with	 providing	 for	 a	reservation)	 the	applicability	of	 foreign	mandatory	 rules	got	 restricted	 to	narrow	and	specific	circumstances.	Due	to	a	cautious	wording	of	article	9§3	of	 the	Rome	1	Regulation,	 foreign	mandatory	rules	will	be	 rarely	applied.	According	 to	the	provision,	 the	only	mandatory	 rules	 that	may	be	applied	are	those	“of	the	law	of	the	country	where	the	obligations	arising	out	of	the	contract	have	to	be	or	have	been	performed”,	and	they	may	be	applied	only	“in	so	far	as	 those	 overriding	 mandatory	 provisions	 render	 the	 performance	 of	 the	 contract																																																									21	On	this	debate,	see	e.g.	:	D.	Bureau	et	H.	Muir	Watt,	Droit	International	Privé,	3e	éd.,	PUF,	2014,	T.	1,	at	n°	914.	
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unlawful”.	 Those	 strict	 conditions	 are	 to	 be	 used	 with	 extreme	 caution,	 since	 “in	considering	 whether	 to	 give	 effect	 to	 those	 provisions,	 regard	 shall	 be	 had	 to	 their	nature	and	purpose	and	to	the	consequences	of	their	application	or	non-application.”		This	 is	particularly	 true	 in	 the	 labour	 law	context.	As	mentioned	above,	 the	 law	of	 the	place	 of	 performance	 is	 the	 law	 applicable	 to	 the	 employment	 contract	 and	must	 be	compared	to	the	law	chosen	by	the	parties.	Therefore,	the	law	mentioned	in	article	9§3	is	 already	 applicable	 to	 the	 employment	 contract,	 and	 there	 is	 no	 need	 for	 foreign	mandatory	rules.		The	question	was	directly	addressed	in	a	recent	and	important	case	from	the	ECJ22.	The	case	concerned	a	Greek	primary	school	teacher	working	in	Germany	for	a	Greek	school.	As	 a	 result	 of	 the	 crisis	 in	 Greece,	 his	 salary	 was	 significantly	 reduced.	 He	 claimed	claimed	additional	payment	before	the	German	court.	The	applicability	of	German	law,	as	 the	 law	 of	 the	 place	 of	 performance,	 was	 not	 disputed.	 The	 Greek	 government,	however,	 argued	 that	Greek	 laws	 on	 salaries	 in	 the	 public	 sector	were	 internationally	mandatory	rules	and	should	therefore	be	applied.		The	Court,	did	not	follow	this	analysis.	In	its	own	words	(n°45)	:	“it	is	apparent	from	the	drafting	history	of	the	Rome	I	Regulation	that	the	EU	legislature	sought	to	restrict	disturbance	to	the	system	of	conflict	of	laws	caused	by	the	application	of	overriding	mandatory	provisions	other	than	those	of	the	State	of	the	forum”		Therefore	(n°50):	“Article	9	of	 the	Rome	I	Regulation	must	(…)	be	 interpreted	as	precluding	the	court	of	the	 forum	 from	 applying,	 as	 legal	 rules,	 overriding	 mandatory	 provisions	 other	 than	those	of	 the	State	of	 the	 forum	or	of	 the	State	where	the	obligations	arising	out	of	 the	contract	 have	 to	 be	 or	 have	 been	 performed.	 Consequently,	 since,	 according	 to	 the	referring	court,	Mr	Nikiforidis’s	employment	contract	has	been	performed	in	Germany,	and	 the	 referring	 court	 is	 German,	 the	 latter	 cannot	 in	 this	 instance	 apply,	 directly	or	indirectly,	 the	Greek	overriding	mandatory	provisions	which	 it	sets	out	 in	 the	 request	for	a	preliminary	ruling.”e	It	is	worth	noting	that	the	Court	left	the	possibility	open	to	take	into	account	the	foreign	mandatory	rule	(n°	52),	but	the	exact	nature	of	this	solution	remains	somewhat	unclear	and	proved	useless	before	the	German	courts23.	In	conclusion,	cases,	particularly	labour	law	cases,	implying	the	application	of	a	foreign	mandatory	rule	are	likely	to	remain	rare.		
																																																								22	ECJ	(Grand	Chamber),	18	october	2016,	Nikiforidis,	Case	C-135/15	23	Bundesarbeitsgericht,	26	April	2017	;	for	an	english	summary,	see	:	http://conflictoflaws.net/2017/pay-day-the-german-federal-labour-court-gives-its-final-ruling-on-foreign-mandatory-rules-in-the-nikiforidis-case/	(last	visit	the	30th	of	June	2017).	
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Regulation	(EC)	No	864/2007	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	11	
July	2007	on	the	law	applicable	to	non-contractual	obligations	(Rome	II)		Article	9	Industrial	action	Without	prejudice	to	Article	4(2),	the	law	applicable	to	a	non-	contractual	obligation	in	respect	 of	 the	 liability	 of	 a	 person	 in	 the	 capacity	 of	 a	worker	 or	 an	 employer	 or	 the	organisations	 representing	 their	 professional	 interests	 for	 damages	 caused	 by	 an	industrial	action,	pending	or	carried	out,	shall	be	the	law	of	the	country	where	the	action	is	to	be,	or	has	been,	taken.			 	
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The	 Rome	 2	 Regulation	 governs	 the	 law	 applicable	 to	 torts.	 The	 Regulation	 is	 not	specifically	designed	to	govern	employment	contracts,	but	a	tortious	action	might	relate	to	labour	issues.		According	to	the	general	rule	of	the	Rome	2	Regulation,	a	tort	is	governed	by	the	law	of	the	habitual	residence,	if	both	the	person	claimed	to	be	liable	and	the	person	sustaining	damage	reside	in	the	same	country	(Article	4§2).	If	those	two	persons	do	not	have	their	habitual	residence	in	the	same	country,	the	applicable	law	is	“the	law	of	the	country	in	which	the	damage	occurs	irrespective	of	the	country	in	which	the	event	giving	rise	to	the	damage	 occurred	 and	 irrespective	 of	 the	 country	 or	 countries	 in	 which	 the	 indirect	consequences	of	that	event	occur”	(Article	4§1).		Articles	4§1	and	§2,	however,	suffer	some	exceptions.		First,	the	escape	clause	in	Article	4§3	may	apply.		It	provides:		“Where	it	is	clear	from	all	the	circumstances	of	the	case	that	the	tort/delict	is	manifestly	more	closely	connected	with	a	country	other	than	that	 indicated	 in	paragraphs	1	or	2,	the	law	of	that	other	country	shall	apply”.	Second,	Article	14	opens	for	a	limited	possibility	of	party	autonomy.		Third,	 other	 exceptions	 concern	 specific	 torts:	 Articles	 5	 to	 9	 give	 a	 list	 of	 torts	 that	follow	different,	autonomous	choice	of	law	rules.	One	of	those	tort	is	the	subject	of	this	section:	Article	9.		Article	 9	 is	 specific	 to	 the	 question	 of	 damages	 caused	 by	 an	 industrial	 action.	 The	governing	law	is	the	one	“of	the	country	where	the	action	is	to	be,	or	has	been,	taken.”	Article	 9	 puts	 the	 emphasis	 on	 the	 place	 of	 the	 harmful	 event,	 and	 is	 therefore	diametrically	 opposed	 to	 Article	 4§1,	 which	 points	 to	 the	 law	 where	 the	 damage	 is	suffered.	
I.	Characterisation	What	 is	 understood	 to	 be	 an	 ‘industrial	 action’	 varies	 greatly	 from	 one	 country	 to	another,	 even	within	 the	 European	Union.24	In	 order	 not	 to	 interfere	with	 the	 various	concepts	of	 ‘industrial	 action’	 existing	 in	 the	Member	States’	 internal	 legal	orders,	 the	Regulation	contains	Recital	28.	It	provides	that	[t]he	special	rule	on	industrial	action	in	Article	9	is	without	prejudice	to	the	conditions	relating	to	the	exercise	of	such	action	in	accordance	with	national	law	and	without	prejudice	to	the	legal	status	of	trade	unions	or	of	the	representative	organisations	of	workers	as	provided	for	in	the	law	of	the	Member	States”.	The	aim	is	to	protect	internal	legal	systems	from	interference	of	the	conflict	of	law	rules	contained	in	Article	9	of	the	Regulation.	Nevertheless,	 characterisation	 issues	 may	 arise	 in	 case	 of	 collective	 industrial	 action.	Three	 type	 of	 legal	 procedures	 are	 most	 common:	 (i)	 actions	 on	 the	 validity	 of	 the	collective	action	;	(ii)	actions	on	the	impact	of	the	collective	action	on	the	employment	contracts	;	(iii)	actions	on	damages	caused	by	the	industrial	action.	Article	9	of	the	Rome	2	Regulation	deals	with	the	third	type.	The	second	type	is	clearly	outside	the	scope	of	the	Regulation:	it	is	generally	accepted	that	an	action	on	the	impact	
																																																								24	See	Recital	n°	27:	“The	exact	concept	of	industrial	action,	such	as	strike	action	or	lock-out,	varies	from	one	Member	State	to	another	and	is	governed	by	each	Member	State’s	internal	rules.”	
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of	a	strike	on	the	employment	contract	is	a	matter	for	the	law	of	the	contract25.	For	the	first	 type,	 however,	 is	 unclear	 whether	 the	 Rome	 2	 Regulation,	 and	 in	 particular	 its	Article	9,	applies.		A	comparison	can	be	drawn	with	the	important,	and,	until	now,	unique	decision	on	the	matter	by	the	ECJ,	although	rendered	in	the	context	of	jurisdiction26.		In	this	case,	the	action	started	after	a	collective	action	that	took	place	in	Sweden	against	a	 Danish	 ship	 owner,	 concerning	 a	 Polish	 crew.	 The	 ship	 owner	 wanted	 to	 obtain	damages	from	the	trade	union	and	seized	the	Danish	courts.	The	Danish	court	were	not	the	court	of	the	defendant’s	domicile,	which	led	the	plaintiff	to	argue	that	Danish	courts	had	 jurisdiction	 as	 the	 “courts	 of	 the	 place	where	 the	 harmful	 event	 occurred”	 on	 th	basis	of	Article	5-3	of	the	Convention.	The	 specific	 Danish	 judicial	 organisation	 is	 somewhat	 unusual,	 because	 two	 different	courts	must	be	seized	in	such	a	case.	First,	the	plaintiff	has	to	seize	the	Arbejdsret,	which	will	hear	the	case	concerning	the	validity	of	the	collective	action.	Then,	the	plaintiff	must	seize	the	Sø-og	Handelsret,	which	will	hear	the	case	concerning	the	employees’	liability.	In	DFDS,	the	case	was	at	the	first	level	when	the	court’s	jurisdiction	was	challenged.	The	issue	therefore	was	whether	the	action	regarding	the	validity	of	the	collective	action	was	a	tortious	one.	The	Court	decided	that	a	“case	concerning	a	legality	of	industrial	action	(…)	falls	within	the	definition	of	tort,	delict	or	quasi-delict”.	Applying	this	decision	per	analogiam	to	the	Rome	2	Regulation,	an	action	concerning	the	legality	of	the	collective	action	should	be	characterized	as	tortious	and	Article	9	should	therefore	be	applicable.	
2.	Connecting	factor	Article	9	is	explicitly	designed	to	protect	the	balance	of	interests	between	workers	and	employers	in	the	country	where	the	industrial	action	takes	place.		As	Recital	26	puts	it:		“this	Regulation	assumes	as	a	general	principle	 that	 the	 law	of	 the	 country	where	 the	industrial	 action	 was	 taken	 should	 apply,	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 protecting	 the	 rights	 and	obligations	of	workers	and	employers”.		The	rationale	behind	this	rule	is	to	guarantee	the	application	of	the	law	of	the	place	of	the	 action.	 Are	 therefore	 disregarded	 the	 law	 chosen	 and,	more	 importantly,	 the	 law	where	 the	 damage	 occurred.	 Article	 9,	 however,	 applies	 “without	 prejudice	 of	 article	4(2)”	 which	 means	 that	 the	 law	 of	 the	 habitual	 residence	 of	 the	 parties	may	 still	 be	relevant.	It	is	difficult	to	imagine	a	situation	where	the	place	of	the	collective	action	and	the	 place	 of	 the	 habitual	 residence	 of	 the	 parties	 do	 not	 coincide,	 and	 therefore,	 the	application	of	the	law	of	the	place	of	the	industrial	action	is	likely	to	apply	anyhow.	The	 solution	of	Article	9	 is	 influenced	by	 the	 following:	 the	rules	on	 industrial	 actions	are	often	 said	 to	be	of	mandatory	nature,	 and	 thus	 considered	as	 international	 lois	de	
police27.	This	argument	is	supported	by	the	fundamental	nature	of	the	right	to	collective																																																									25	For	a	general	and	comparative	overview,	see	:	P.	Dorssemont, T. Jaspers and A. van Hoek (dir.) Cross-
border collective actions in Europe : a legal challenge, Intersentia, Social Europe Series 13, 2007.	26	ECJ,	5	February	2004,	DFDS	Torline	v.	SEKO,	C-18/02	27	J.P.	Laborde,	«	Conflits	collectifs	et	conflits	de	lois	»,	Droit	Social	2001.	715,	at	p.	717.	
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action,	which	 is,	 under	many	 legal	 systems,	 of	 constitutional	 value	 and	 now	 explicitly	recognised	in	the	Charter	of	fundamental	rights	of	the	EU	(article	28).		While	 the	Rome	2	Regulation	does	not	 follow	the	 idea	to	apply	the	rules	on	 industrial	actions	as	lois	de	police,	the	result	under	Article	9	will	often	be	the	same.	The	combined	effect	the	tortious	characterisation	and	the	application	of	the	law	of	the	place	where	the	industrial	action	took	place,	will	likely	guarantee	that	no	other	law	will	be	applicable	to	legal	actions	deriving	from	the	industrial	action.		The	exclusion	of	 the	 law	of	 the	damage	under	Article	9	 is	 to	be	welcomed;	 it	could	be	very	difficult	for	the	State	where	the	collective	action	took	place	to	accept	or	recognise	a	decision	which	applied	a	law	other	than	its	own28.			
																																																								28	E.	Pataut,	“La	grève	dans	les	rapport	internationaux	de	travail:	questions	de	qualifications”,	Droit	Social,	2005.	303,	at	306.		
